Archive | July, 2010

California Storing DNA of Innocent People

31 Jul

California’s law mandating that DNA samples be taken from all felony arrestees is facing a legal challenge from the ACLU of Northern California.

July 30, 2010 |

Forcing people to provide a DNA sample without any judicial oversight, just because a single police officer has arrested them, violates the Constitution. That’s why California’s law mandating that DNA samples be taken from all felony arrestees is facing a legal challenge from the ACLU of Northern California (ACLU-NC).

At issue is Proposition 69, a voter-enacted law which mandates that anyone arrested on suspicion of a felony in California has to hand over a DNA sample, regardless of whether or not they are ever charged or convicted. As a result, tens of thousands of innocent Californians will be subject to a lifetime of genetic surveillance because a single police officer suspected them of a crime.

ACLU-NC filed suit in federal court last year seeking to stop this invasive law that violates the Fourth Amendment. Last week, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral arguments in the ACLU’s appeal of a lower court’s denial of a request for a preliminary injunction to halt the law while the suit continues. The appeals court hearing on July 13 showed that the court takes the privacy concerns and other constitutional issues in this case very seriously. The court clearly recognized the importance of the case, questioning both sides closely and extending the time allotted for oral argument.

Instead of being limited to serious, violent offenses, this law even applies to someone who has written a bad check, shoplifters, and people arrested during political demonstrations. And because collection occurs before any review by a prosecutor or a court, even people who are wrongfully arrested — either because of police misconduct or because the police simply had been provided with incorrect information — will be ordered to provide a sample. For example, a domestic violence victim who injured her partner in self defense might well be arrested while the police investigated her story and then released when they confirmed it, but would still have had to provide a sample.

The practice of automatically collecting DNA from people who are merely arrested ignores the presumption of innocence and blurs the line between being suspected of a crime and being convicted.

The lead plaintiff in the suit, Lily Haskell, was arrested at a peace rally in San Francisco. She was not charged with a crime and was quickly released, but not before being required to provide a DNA sample. When your DNA is taken after an arrest at a political demonstration, it can have a silencing effect on political action. Now, her genetic information is stored indefinitely in a government database.

Data from the California Department of Justice reveal that nearly one-third of the 300,000 arrests every year in California on suspicion of a felony never result in a conviction. A disproportionate number of these arrestees are people of color.Communities of color will face an even greater burden from the impact of this kind of genetic surveillance. Moreover, there are reports from Great Britain, which also takes DNA from some persons who are arrested, of police making arrests without cause simply to obtain a DNA sample to put in the country’s database.

Databanks should focus on people who have been convicted of crimes, not on those whom a single police officer thinks may have committed a crime — that is a better use of our limited resources and it’s what the constitution demands.

Meanwhile, California’s huge forensic DNA database — the third largest in the world — already faces tremendous backlogs. The resources spent collecting thousands upon thousands of DNA samples from arrestees detract from the resources that could instead be devoted to processing crime scene samples to help solve violent and serious crimes like rape, assault, and murder.

This originally appeared on the ACLU’s Blog of Rights.
Source: AlertNet

State high court limits courts’ parole power

30 Jul

Bob Egelko, Chronicle Staff Writer

Judges who decide a life-term prisoner was unfairly denied parole can’t order the inmate freed but must return the case to the state parole board for a new review, the California Supreme Court ruled Thursday.

The unanimous decision comes as California judges and appellate courts have been taking a harder look at the Board of Parole Hearings’ denials of release to convicted murderers whose sentences make them eligible for parole after 15 years or more in prison.

The state’s high court ruled in 2008 that the board can’t reject a parole-eligible prisoner based solely on the facts of the crime, but must have evidence – such as the inmate’s criminal record, misconduct in prison or psychiatric reports – showing that he or she would be dangerous if released.

On Thursday, however, the justices limited lower courts’ power to overrule the parole board. If a court finds that the board had no valid reason to deny parole, the Supreme Court said, it must send the case back to let board members decide whether the inmate’s recent conduct, and other evidence it did not consider before, were grounds for prolonging the sentence.

“Intrusions by the judiciary into the executive branch‘s realm of parole matters may violate the separation of powers,” said Chief Justice Ronald George, referring to the parole board’s status as an executive agency.

Michael Satris, lawyer for one of the two inmates in the case, said the ruling “put prisoners back on the merry-go-round of a parole consideration that the courts have already found has been arbitrary.”

Satris’ client, Miguel Molina, shot a fellow farmworker to death in Arroyo Grande (San Luis Obispo County) in 1984, pleaded no contest to second-degree murder and was sentenced to 15 years to life.

The board refused to release Molina in 2006, saying his assertion that he had acted in self-defense showed he lacked insight into his crime.

But a state appeals court, citing his prison record and favorable evaluations, said there was no evidence Molina would be dangerous and ordered him paroled, a decision the Supreme Court overturned Thursday.

The other case involved Robert Prather, a Los Angeles County man who pleaded guilty to first-degree murder for a 1982 killing during an attempted robbery. Sentenced to 27 years to life, he was granted parole by the board in 2005 and 2006, was turned down by Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger both times, and then was denied parole in 2007.

An appeals court overruled the board, saying the psychiatric report it relied on in 2007 was the same one it had considered when approving Prather in 2006. The court did not order him released but said the parole board could consider only evidence of his post-2007 behavior in its next hearing. The state’s high court rejected that limitation Thursday.

Lawyers for both men said the parole board has since held new hearings and approved both of them for release. Satris said Schwarzenegger vetoed the board’s decision to parole Molina, an action he is challenging in court. The governor’s office said he has until Aug. 20 to rule on Prather.

The ruling in Prather on Habeas Corpus, S172903, can be read at links.sfgate.com/ZKBN.

Source: SF Chronicle

Rough Justice in America- Too many laws, too many prisoners

30 Jul

Never in the civilised world have so many been locked up for so little

Jul 22nd 2010 | Spring, Texas

THREE pickup trucks pulled up outside George Norris’s home in Spring, Texas. Six armed police in flak jackets jumped out. Thinking they must have come to the wrong place, Mr Norris opened his front door, and was startled to be shoved against a wall and frisked for weapons. He was forced into a chair for four hours while officers ransacked his house. They pulled out drawers, rifled through papers, dumped things on the floor and eventually loaded 37 boxes of Mr Norris’s possessions onto their pickups. They refused to tell him what he had done wrong. “It wasn’t fun, I can tell you that,” he recalls.

Mr Norris was 65 years old at the time, and a collector of orchids. He eventually discovered that he was suspected of smuggling the flowers into America, an offence under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. This came as a shock. He did indeed import flowers and sell them to other orchid-lovers. And it was true that his suppliers in Latin America were sometimes sloppy about their paperwork. In a shipment of many similar-looking plants, it was rare for each permit to match each orchid precisely.

In March 2004, five months after the raid, Mr Norris was indicted, handcuffed and thrown into a cell with a suspected murderer and two suspected drug-dealers. When told why he was there, “they thought it hilarious.” One asked: “What do you do with these things? Smoke ’em?”

Prosecutors described Mr Norris as the “kingpin” of an international smuggling ring. He was dumbfounded: his annual profits were never more than about $20,000. When prosecutors suggested that he should inform on other smugglers in return for a lighter sentence, he refused, insisting he knew nothing beyond hearsay.

He pleaded innocent. But an undercover federal agent had ordered some orchids from him, a few of which arrived without the correct papers. For this, he was charged with making a false statement to a government official, a federal crime punishable by up to five years in prison. Since he had communicated with his suppliers, he was charged with conspiracy, which also carries a potential five-year term.

As his legal bills exploded, Mr Norris reluctantly changed his plea to guilty, though he still protests his innocence. He was sentenced to 17 months in prison. After some time, he was released while his appeal was heard, but then put back inside. His health suffered: he has Parkinson’s disease, which was not helped by the strain of imprisonment. For bringing some prescription sleeping pills into prison, he was put in solitary confinement for 71 days. The prison was so crowded, however, that even in solitary he had two room-mates.


A long love affair with lock and key

Justice is harsher in America than in any other rich country. Between 2.3m and 2.4m Americans are behind bars, roughly one in every 100 adults. If those on parole or probation are included, one adult in 31 is under “correctional” supervision. As a proportion of its total population, America incarcerates five times more people than Britain, nine times more than Germany and 12 times more than Japan. Overcrowding is the norm. Federal prisons house 60% more inmates than they were designed for. State lock-ups are only slightly less stuffed.

The system has three big flaws, say criminologists. First, it puts too many people away for too long. Second, it criminalises acts that need not be criminalised. Third, it is unpredictable. Many laws, especially federal ones, are so vaguely written that people cannot easily tell whether they have broken them.

In 1970 the proportion of Americans behind bars was below one in 400, compared with today’s one in 100. Since then, the voters, alarmed at a surge in violent crime, have demanded fiercer sentences. Politicians have obliged. New laws have removed from judges much of their discretion to set a sentence that takes full account of the circumstances of the offence. Since no politician wants to be tarred as soft on crime, such laws, mandating minimum sentences, are seldom softened. On the contrary, they tend to get harder.

Some criminals belong behind bars. When a habitual rapist is locked up, the streets are safer. But the same is not necessarily true of petty drug-dealers, whose incarceration creates a vacancy for someone else to fill, argues Alfred Blumstein of Carnegie Mellon University. The number of drug offenders in federal and state lock-ups has increased 13-fold since 1980. Some are scary thugs; many are not.

Michelle Collette of Hanover, Massachusetts, sold Percocet, a prescription painkiller. “I was planning to do it just once,” she says, “but the money was so easy. And I thought: it’s not heroin.” Then she became addicted to her own wares. She was unhappy with her boyfriend, she explains, but did not want to split up with him, because she did not want their child to grow up fatherless, as she had. So she popped pills to numb the misery. Before long, she was taking 20-30 a day.

When Ms Collette and her boyfriend, who also sold drugs, were arrested in a dawn raid, the police found 607 pills and $901 in cash. The boyfriend fought the charges and got 15 years in prison. In a plea bargain Ms Collette was sentenced to seven years, of which she served six.

“I don’t think this is fair,” said the judge. “I don’t think this is what our laws are meant to do. It’s going to cost upwards of $50,000 a year to have you in state prison. Had I the authority, I would send you to jail for no more than one year…and a [treatment] programme after that.” But mandatory sentencing laws gave him no choice.

Massachusetts is a liberal state, but its drug laws are anything but. It treats opium-derived painkillers such as Percocet like hard drugs, if illicitly sold. Possession of a tiny amount (14-28 grams, or ½-1 ounce) yields a minimum sentence of three years. For 200 grams, it is 15 years, more than the minimum for armed rape. And the weight of the other substances with which a dealer mixes his drugs is included in the total, so 10 grams of opiates mixed with 190 grams of flour gets you 15 years.

Ms Collette underwent drug treatment before being locked up, and is now clean. But in prison she found she was pregnant. After going through labour shackled to a hospital bed, she was allowed only 48 hours to bond with her newborn son. She was released in March, found a job in a shop, and is hoping that her son will get used to having her around.

Rigid sentencing laws shift power from judges to prosecutors, complains Barbara Dougan of Families Against Mandatory Minimums, a pressure-group. Even the smallest dealer often has enough to trigger a colossal sentence. Prosecutors may charge him with selling a smaller amount if he agrees to “reel some other poor slob in”, as Ms Dougan puts it. He is told to persuade another dealer to sell him just enough drugs to trigger a 15-year sentence, and perhaps to do the deal near a school, which adds another two years.

Severe drug laws have unintended consequences. Less than half of American cancer patients receive adequate painkillers, according to the American Pain Foundation, another pressure-group. One reason is that doctors are terrified of being accused of drug-trafficking if they over-prescribe. In 2004 William Hurwitz, a doctor specialising in the control of pain, was sentenced to 25 years in prison for prescribing pills that a few patients then resold on the black market. Virginia’s board of medicine ruled that he had acted in good faith, but he still served nearly four years.

Half the states have laws that lock up habitual offenders for life. In some states this applies only to violent criminals, but in others it applies even to petty ones. Some 3,700 people who committed neither violent nor serious crimes are serving life sentences under California’s “three strikes and you’re out” law. In Alabama a petty thief called Jerald Sanders was given a life term for pinching a bicycle. Alabama’s judges are elected, as are those in 32 other states. This makes them mindful of public opinion: some appear in campaign advertisements waving guns and bragging about how tough they are.

Watching hairs go white, and lifetimes ebb away

Many Americans assume that white-collar criminals get off lightly, but many do not. Granted, they may be hard to catch and can often afford good lawyers. But federal prosecutors can file many charges for what is essentially one offence. For example, they can count each e-mail sent by a white-collar criminal in the course of his criminal activity as a separate case of wire fraud, each of which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years. The decades soon add up. Sentences depend partly on the size of the loss and the number of people affected, so if you work for a big, publicly traded company, you break a rule and the share-price drops, watch out.


Eternal punishment

Jim Felman, a defence lawyer in Tampa, Florida, says America is conducting “an experiment in imprisoning first-time non-violent offenders for periods of time previously reserved only for those who had killed someone”. One of Mr Felman’s clients, a fraudster called Sholam Weiss, was sentenced to 845 years. “I got it reduced to 835,” sighs Mr Felman. Faced with such penalties, he says, the incentive to co-operate, which means to say things that are helpful to the prosecution, is overwhelming. And this, he believes, “warps the truth-seeking function” of justice.

Innocent defendants may plead guilty in return for a shorter sentence to avoid the risk of a much longer one. A prosecutor can credibly threaten a middle-aged man that he will die in a cell unless he gives evidence against his boss. This is unfair, complains Harvey Silverglate, the author of “Three Felonies a Day: How the Feds Target the Innocent”. If a defence lawyer offers a witness money to testify that his client is innocent, that is bribery. But a prosecutor can legally offer something of far greater value—his freedom—to a witness who says the opposite. The potential for wrongful convictions is obvious.

Badly drafted laws create traps for the unwary. In 2006 Georgia Thompson, a civil servant in Wisconsin, was sentenced to 18 months in prison for depriving the public of “the intangible right of honest services”. Her crime was to award a contract (for travel services) to the best bidder. A firm called Adelman Travel scored the most points (on an official scale) for price and quality, so Ms Thompson picked it. She ignored a rule that required her to penalise Adelman for a slapdash presentation when bidding. For this act of common sense, she served four months. (An appeals court freed her.)

The “honest services” statute, if taken seriously, “would seemingly cover a salaried employee’s phoning in sick to go to a ball game,” fumes Antonin Scalia, a Supreme Court justice. The Supreme Court ruled recently that the statute was so vague as to be unconstitutional. It did not strike it down completely, but said it should be applied only in cases involving bribery or kickbacks. The challenge was brought by Enron’s former boss, Jeff Skilling, who will not go free despite his victory, and Conrad Black, a media magnate released this week on bail pending an appeal, who may.

There are over 4,000 federal crimes, and many times that number of regulations that carry criminal penalties. When analysts at the Congressional Research Service tried to count the number of separate offences on the books, they were forced to give up, exhausted. Rules concerning corporate governance or the environment are often impossible to understand, yet breaking them can land you in prison. In many criminal cases, the common-law requirement that a defendant must have a mens rea (ie, he must or should know that he is doing wrong) has been weakened or erased.

“The founders viewed the criminal sanction as a last resort, reserved for serious offences, clearly defined, so ordinary citizens would know whether they were violating the law. Yet over the last 40 years, an unholy alliance of big-business-hating liberals and tough-on-crime conservatives has made criminalisation the first line of attack—a way to demonstrate seriousness about the social problem of the month, whether it’s corporate scandals or e-mail spam,” writes Gene Healy, a libertarian scholar. “You can serve federal time for interstate transport of water hyacinths, trafficking in unlicensed dentures, or misappropriating the likeness of Woodsy Owl.”

“You’re (probably) a federal criminal,” declares Alex Kozinski, an appeals-court judge, in a provocative essay of that title. Making a false statement to a federal official is an offence. So is lying to someone who then repeats your lie to a federal official. Failing to prevent your employees from breaking regulations you have never heard of can be a crime. A boss got six months in prison because one of his workers accidentally broke a pipe, causing oil to spill into a river. “It didn’t matter that he had no reason to learn about the [Clean Water Act’s] labyrinth of regulations, since he was merely a railroad-construction supervisor,” laments Judge Kozinski.

Society wants retribution

Such cases account for only a tiny share of the Americans behind bars, but they still matter. When so many people are technically breaking the law, it is up to prosecutors to decide whom to pursue. No doubt most prosecutors choose wisely. But members of unpopular groups may not find that reassuring. Ms Thompson, for example, was prosecuted just before an election, at a time when allegations of public corruption in Wisconsin were in the news. Some prosecutors, such as Eliot Spitzer, the disgraced ex-governor of New York, have built political careers by nailing people whom voters don’t like, such as financiers.


Prison deters? Not much, not the worst

Some people argue that the system works: that crime has fallen in the past two decades because the bad guys are either in prison or scared of being sent there. Caged thugs cannot break into your home. Bernie Madoff’s 150-year sentence for running a Ponzi scam should deter imitators. And indeed the crime rate continues to drop, despite the recession, as Michael Rushford of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, an advocacy group, points out. This, he says, is because habitual criminals face serious consequences. Some research supports him: after raking through decades of historical data, John Donohue of Yale Law School estimates that a 10% increase in imprisonment brings a 2% reduction in crime.

Others disagree. Using more recent data, Bert Useem of Purdue University and Anne Piehl of Rutgers University estimate that a 10% increase in the number of people behind bars would reduce crime by only 0.5%. In the states that currently lock up the most people, imprisoning more would actually increase crime, they believe. Some inmates emerge from prison as more accomplished criminals. And raising the incarceration rate means locking up people who are, on average, less dangerous than the ones already behind bars. A recent study found that, over the past 13 years, the proportion of new prisoners in Florida who had committed violent crimes fell by 28%, whereas those inside for “other” crimes shot up by 189%. These “other” crimes were non-violent ones involving neither drugs nor theft, such as driving with a suspended licence.


And now the reckoning, in dollars

Crime is a young man’s game. Muggers over 30 are rare. Ex-cons who go straight for a few years generally stay that way: a study of 88,000 criminals by Mr Blumstein found that if someone was arrested for aggravated assault at the age of 18 but then managed to stay out of trouble until the age of 22, the risk of his offending was no greater than that for the general population. Yet America’s prisons are crammed with old folk. Nearly 200,000 prisoners are over 50. Most would pose little threat if released. And since people age faster in prison than outside, their medical costs are vast. Human Rights Watch, a lobby-group, talks of “nursing homes with razor wire”.

Jail is expensive. Spending per prisoner ranges from $18,000 a year in Mississippi to about $50,000 in California, where the cost per pupil is but a seventh of that. “[W]e are well past the point of diminishing returns,” says a report by the Pew Center on the States. In Washington state, for example, each dollar invested in new prison places in 1980 averted more than nine dollars of criminal harm (using a somewhat arbitrary scale to assign a value to not being beaten up). By 2001, as the emphasis shifted from violent criminals to drug-dealers and thieves, the cost-benefit ratio reversed. Each new dollar spent on prisons averted only 37 cents’ worth of harm.

Since the recession threw their budgets into turmoil, many states have decided to imprison fewer people, largely to save money. Mississippi has reduced the proportion of their sentences that non-violent offenders are required to serve from 85% to 25%. Texas is making greater use of non-custodial penalties. New York has repealed most mandatory minimum terms for drug offences. In all, the number of prisoners in state lock-ups fell by 0.3% in 2009, the first fall since 1972. But the total number of Americans behind bars still rose slightly, because the number of federal prisoners climbed by 3.4%.

A less punitive system could work better, argues Mark Kleiman of the University of California, Los Angeles. Swift and certain penalties deter more than harsh ones. Money spent on prisons cannot be spent on more cost-effective methods of crime-prevention, such as better policing, drug treatment or probation. The pain that punishment inflicts on criminals themselves, on their families and on their communities should also be taken into account.

“Just by making effective use of things we already know how to do, we could reasonably expect to have half as much crime and half as many people behind bars ten years from now,” says Mr Kleiman. “There are a thousand excuses for failing to make that effort, but not one good reason.”

Source: The Economist

Mandatory sentencing in California-Cooley’s law

29 Jul

A Republican district attorney seeks to make three-strikes more humane

Jul 29th 2010 | Los Angeles

THE judge remembered Larry South well when he saw him in a Los Angeles courtroom in June. Twelve years had gone by since he had sentenced Mr South to life in prison for attempting to steal $29-worth of plumbing supplies from Home Depot. Now, however, Mr South was in court to be freed. “I’m so pleased,” said the judge. Emily Galvin, his lawyer, held back tears as Mr South embraced his sons, aged 19 and 12. Even the prosecutor seemed delighted.

That prosecutor’s attitude represents a potential earthquake in the evolution of California’s three-strikes law, the most severe of the mandatory-sentencing reforms adopted by 26 states in recent decades. The law, approved by voters in 1994, requires a double sentence for offenders with one previous criminal conviction and 25 years-to-life for those with two previous strikes. As a teenager in the 1980s Mr South had twice stumbled drunkenly into garages, attempting (and failing) to steal something. The prosecutor in 1998 counted these as two previous strikes and demanded life.

But that was when Los Angeles County had a different district attorney. The current one, Steve Cooley, has other ideas about Three Strikes, which he values as a “powerful recidivist tool” but also considers “draconian”. Mr Cooley has become the first DA in California to have a written policy not to invoke the three-strikes law when neither the current crime nor the previous strikes are violent or serious.

His approach is especially noteworthy because Mr Cooley is also the Republican candidate for attorney-general of the whole state. As a conservative, he need not be as paranoid as his Democratic rival about being called soft on crime. The son of an FBI agent and a proponent of the death penalty, Mr Cooley can point out the obvious—that the law is often egregiously unjust—and still be considered tough.

His Democratic opponent, Kamala Harris, agrees with him on three strikes, but has so far been more circumspect. As district attorney of San Francisco, which many Californians consider quasi-Jacobin, she has to work harder to seem tough. Her Jamaican father and Tamil mother went to Berkeley in the 1960s and marched in the streets. And her sister once lobbied for a (failed) ballot initiative that would have reformed the three-strikes law to exclude non-violent crimes.

Both Ms Harris and Mr Cooley opposed that reform. But Mr Cooley then proposed one that was only slightly more conservative. It would have stopped counting non-violent, non-serious crimes as third strikes, unless a previous strike was heinous. That initiative also failed. Ms Harris thought it “went too far”.

And so, with a Republican unexpectedly in the lead, the debate about the three-strikes law has been set in motion. Its injustices have become embarrassing even to right-wingers. Elaine Howle, the state auditor, recently reported that of the 171,500 inmates in California’s overcrowded prisons last year, a quarter (43,500) were sentenced under the three-strikes law. More than half of these are locked up for crimes that were not serious, at a cost of $7.5 billion.

In the absence of a change in the law, therefore, increasing discretion by prosecutors may be the best way forward. Mr Cooley certainly thinks so, and his stance provided the opening for Ms Galvin. When she revived Mr South’s case in Los Angeles, she met no resistance.

Mr South has since found a job at the docks. He is catching up with the free world and is learning to text. He is getting reacquainted with his sons. Within California’s brutal system, he represents one case that turned out right.

Source: The Economist

DNA clears Houston man 27 years after conviction

29 Jul

By BRIAN ROGERS
Copyright 2010 Houston Chronicle

July 28, 2010

photo
TDCJ

Michael Anthony Green was convicted by faulty eyewitness identification.

LONG ROADS TO FREEDOM

Inmates from Harris County who have been freed after their convictions turned out to have been based on faulty evidence:

• Allen Wayne Porter: Released last Friday after serving 19 years for a June 1980 rape conviction. Though DNA testing appeared to clear him in 2004, it was not until last week that a judge ordered him freed after those who committed the crime testified Porter was not involved.

• Ernest Sonnier: Released Aug. 7, 2009, after serving 23 years for the 1985 abduction and rape of an Alief woman. DNA testing implicated two con-victed felons as the actual perpetrators. Sonnier was released pending further investigation by the Harris County District Attorney’s office.

• Gary Alvin Richard: Released April 30, 2009, after serving more than 22 years of a life sentence on kidnapping, rape and robbery convictions. Forensic tests confirmed incriminating testimony a crime lab supervisor offered at Richard’s trial was false. Although he was released, the case against him remains.

• Ricardo Rachell: Released in December 2008 after serving nearly six years of a 40-year prison term in a sexual assault conviction. Cleared by DNA evidence collected in 2002 but not examined until last year. In January, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals overturned his conviction, clearing the way for him to apply for a pardon on the basis of actual innocence.

• Ronald Gene Taylor: Released in October 2007 after serving 14 years of a 60-year rape sentence. DNA testing on the rape victim’s bedsheet revealed that another man with a history of sexual violence had committed the crime.

• George Rodriguez: Released in 2004 after serving 17 years in prison for a kidnapping and rape conviction. In June 2009, a federal jury awarded Rodriguez $5 million, finding the city should pay for its “deliberate indifference” to problems at the crime lab.

• Josiah Sutton: Released in March 2003 after serving 4½ years of a 25-year sentence for a rape conviction. DNA tests discredited those performed by the crime lab. Gov. Rick Perry granted him a pardon on the basis of innocence, rather than a lesser “full” pardon, in May 2004.

A Houston man is expected to be freed this week after serving more than 27 years in prison — the longest time behind bars of any Texan who has been exonerated – for a rape prosecutors now say he did not commit.

Michael Anthony Green, 45, is expected to be in court today, when his attorney, Bob Wicoff, will ask that he be released on bail while the case moves forward.

If freed, Green would be the eighth local man let out of prison in recent years, and the second in a week, after serving time for a crime he did not commit.

“He is innocent,” Wicoff said. “We’ve got the bad guys, too. We’ve pegged the bad guys.”

Green was sentenced to 75 years in prison for the 1983 rape of a Houston woman based on faulty eyewitness identification, Wicoff said.

According to court records, a woman talking on a pay phone with her husband was abducted at gunpoint by two men at a Greenspoint-area gas station after midnight on April 18, 1983. They forced her into a car with two other men. Her abductors drove the victim to a secluded area, where three of them sexually assaulted her. The fourth man did not participate.

Wicoff credited attorneys and investigators in the Post Conviction Review Section of the Harris County District Attorney’s Office with finding a pair of jeans stored in a warehouse that had been worn by the victim during the crime, then testing it for DNA evidence. The results excluded Green.

Statute of limitations

District Attorney Pat Lykos said the office has identified all four men suspected in the crime, including the three believed to have sexually assaulted the victim.

Three of the men have been convicted of other crimes and spent time in prison. Two are still behind bars, prosecutors said.

Because the statute of limitations elapsed, none of the men can be prosecuted for the crime, according to Lykos.

The prosecutor assigned to the case, Assistant District Attorney Alicia O’Neal, said the victim was aware of the development but declined to comment.

Records show Green appealed his case several times since 1983, to no avail. DNA testing still was years away from common use in 1983, but Green filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing in 2005. Prosecutors took a swab of his DNA in February 2009.

Last month, O’Neal learned Green had been excluded from the DNA profiles found on the victim’s jeans.

Two other men matched DNA that had been recorded in the national DNA database. A third man’s DNA also was found.

Through interviews with the two suspects, investigators were led to two more men. Test results returned this week showed that one of those two, not Green, was the third man involved in the sexual assault. One of the suspects admitted he was there and said Green was not.

Faulty identification

Green was picked up the night of the assault by officers looking for a stolen black car in the area where the woman was raped. According to court records, when police spotted the car and pulled it over, the four black men inside fled. Police began stopping all black men walking in the area and detained Green, who is black.

Green and another man were left in a police car that night, illuminated by headlights, while the victim was brought to the scene. Court records say the woman saw both men but said neither was among those who had assaulted her.

Eight days later, how­ever, police showed the victim a photo array that included Green, and she picked him out. Later that day, she picked him out of a live lineup.

The victim identified him in court four months later, after having seen him three times. He was the only person convicted of the crime, according the District Attorney’s Office.

Wicoff blamed police for the false eyewitness identification.

“DNA freed this guy. Bad police work put him away,” Wicoff said. “This was HPD’s fault.”

The district attorney’s office said its investigation showed no misconduct or negligence on the part of the initial investigators or attorneys involved in either side of the 1983 trial.

‘We can start sleeping’

Houston Police Department spokesman Victor Senties said police officials wanted to wait for the court’s ruling and see documentation about the case before responding to any allegations.

In a news release, Lykos’ first assistant, Jim Leitner, appeared to slam prior district attorney administrations for the length of time the case stalled.

“The evidence in this case had been sitting in the District Clerk’s Office for 27 years, and no one had taken the initiative to do anything with it in the past,” Leitner said. “The difference now is that you’ve got the Post Conviction Review Section looking into it – and that made all the difference in the case of Mr. Green.”

Lykos declined to comment on Leitner’s remarks.

Wicoff said certain court procedures need to be followed to have Green’s actual innocence declared.

If Green is released, he said, that paperwork can be completed without the sense of urgency that has marked the last week.

“We can start sleeping at night,” Wicoff said.

Green’s only other conviction was a misdemeanor of evading arrest, for which he served 45 days. He also was arrested for car theft, but that charge was dismissed, according to court records.

$80,000 per year possible

Wicoff said Green has served the longest prison sentence of an exonerated man in Texas.

If he is ruled innocent, he could be eligible for a one-time payment from the state of more than $2 million, $80,000 for every year he was wrongfully confined.

The final ruling on Green’s innocence will be made by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which also is scheduled to review the 1990 sexual assault conviction of Allen Wayne Porter.

Porter, 39, was freed last Friday after the district attorney’s office, in a similar investigation, uncovered evidence of his innocence. Porter had spent 19 years in prison.

Lykos said the case was a clarion call for a regional crime lab, a project she campaigned on, noting a backlog of rape kits continues to grow at the HPD crime lab. She has argued for more resources to be used for DNA testing in current and past cases.

“If this case isn’t the poster case for the regional crime lab, I don’t know what is,” the district attorney said.

Source: Houston Chronicle


Don’t Drink the Water at Wasco State Prison

29 Jul

Friday, July 23, 2010

This is a story about a real-life situation here in Wasco State Prison. To be honest with you I didn’t want to share this, but I’ll tell you my side of the story as I seen it! Oh yeah, also living in it! I am in WSP as an inmate without proper drinking water. I’m talking about clean water.

It’s 2:30 p.m., 7/15/10. We have no clean water to drink. I’ve been here since 7/9/10 and today was the first time that someone mentioned that there has been a problem for months with the water here. Today I heard someone on the intercom say, “Do not drink water,” stay away from the water! I’ve been drinking the water for days, now I hear it’s contaminated with “e-coli” among other things.

I ain’t the smartest, but I do know that something’s wrong here; someone here that controls that issue has failed at keeping safe drinking water for us.

We were given the heads-up about not to drink the water at 2:30 p.m. OK, thanks! What do we now drink? The word has been “It’s on its way” for almost six hours: It’s 10 p.m. now. Time to speak out!

10:30 p.m.: Did I mention that I’m in Wasco, California (Bakersfield)? It’s about a sweaty, thirsty, 90 degrees in here. That’s what the thermometer says. It feels like 120 degrees, easy! And has all day here. I feel like I am in the desert—oh yeah, we are in the desert! Shit’s about to go down. Two hundred-plus inmates without water for several hours now—what do you think? We need no better excuse! Did I mention prison inmates?

The words cruel and unusual punishment cross my mind. What do you have when 200-plus inmates have been without showers or drinking water for hours? Oh, I mean angry/thirsty gang members, and a few thirsty drunk drivers as well. (A beer sounds nice.)

Just got word: Fresh water’s here! OK, now, how fresh is it? Oh, it’s been boiled down. Does that kill e-coli, botulism, etc? My bad, I don’t know how to spell the words but I do know what they mean: feces. Human/animal feces, to say it nicely. Right? I now heard it’s been going on for weeks, but now it’s being told. No one said anything as I got here, no mention of it in receiving. No mention of failed tests, five times this month! So why were we given foods and beverages made with this water? The state of California has problems. I now realize why I have cramps and the headaches. It’s the water! For the last seven days! A referral to a lawyer would be nice. These people here act like money’s coming out of their checks for the water!

Somebody please call Arnold! We need “The Germinator”! I hope this is not part of his big budget-saving tactics.

Next day, 7/16/10, 8:30 a.m.: Posted memo states that it’s “e-coliforms.” Shit. Speaks about boiling water, and not to do this and that. We have no source to do any of the procedures to boil/filter, etc.; we’re in jail, duh! There’s one Igloo [cooler] for 200 inmates. Also, here’s a number to get info: 661-758-8400. Oh, water’s gone in minutes, still no solution. They say it’s been contaminated for weeks now—why are we barely being told not to drink it? What about those on lockdown here, with no way to reach for an Igloo? But that’s a different subject.

Years ago I wrote the Santa Barbara News-Press about certain police officers using a bit of force. Could you run this story and if possible set me up with a subscription for The Independent?—John John Ramirez, #T. 92587, Wasco, CA

Source: Santa Barbara Independent

Special News Browse….today’s happenings

28 Jul

Something a little different here today as there is lots of happenings in criminal justice today…..read on!!

Tuesday, July 27, 2010

House approves creation of National Criminal Justice Commission

Though we still await action from the House of Representatives on reform of the crack sentencing statutes, here is some notable news from the people’s chamber (as reported via an e-mail from The Sentencing Project):

The House of Representatives today passed legislation that would establish a national commission to conduct a thorough evaluation of the nation’s justice system and offer recommendations for reform in a range of areas, including sentencing policy, rates of incarceration, law enforcement, crime prevention, substance abuse, corrections and reentry.

The National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2010, H.R. 5143, passed by voice vote under a suspension of the rules. The bipartisan legislation, introduced by Reps. William Delahunt (D-MA), Darrell Issa (R-CA), Marcia Fudge (D-OH), Tom Rooney (R-FL) and Robert “Bobby” Scott (D-VA), now awaits passage in the Senate where it was introduced by Senator Jim Webb (D-VA).

The bipartisan commission created by this legislation would establish an organized and proactive approach to studying and advancing programs and policies that promote public safety, while overhauling those practices that are found to be fundamentally flawed. The “blue-ribbon” commission would be charged with conducting an 18-month, top-to-bottom review of the nation’s entire criminal justice system and offer concrete recommendations for reform.

I am pleased to hear of this news, and I am certain that a National Criminal Justice Commission could and would develop lots of good ideas for federal and state criminal justice reform.

The modern problem, however, is not a lack of good ideas, but a lack of leaders willing to help ensure good ideas become law.  After all, the bipartisan “blue-ribbon” commission known as the US Sentencing Commission has been making a forceful and impassioned call for reform of the 100-1 crack/powder sentencing statutes for 15 years, and we are still awaiting a change.  I am hopeful that this action on the National Criminal Justice Commission Act of 2010 is a prelude to action on crack sentencing reform, but I am not going to count any sentencing chickens until they are fully hatched.

UPDATE: This press release from Congressman Bill Delahunt provides more details about the Act.

http://sentencing. typepad.com/

********************************************************************************************************************

From: Julie Stewart, FAMM <famm@famm.org>
Subject: We won! We won! We won!!!
To: “Carol Leonard” <carolleo864@ yahoo.com>
Date: Wednesday, July 28, 2010, 4:17 PM

We won! We won! We won!!!

Families Against Mandatory Minimums logo
Dear Carol,
Yes, we won!  Minutes ago the U.S. House of Representatives voted to make crack cocaine sentencing
laws more sensible and fair!  Your calls and letters to Congress made a difference!
This is a fantastic victory – and one we have fought for more than 15 years!  It will affect about
3,000 people each year, reducing excessively high crack penalties by more than two years on average.
Right now the law is not retroactive but we are going to fight for retroactivity as soon as the bill is signed!
To read FAMM’s press release, click here.
The bill will go straight to President Obama for his signature, within the next ten days.
Thank you for sticking with me during this long haul.  I know that the pace of sentencing reform
is painfully slow and discouraging but, hopefully, this victory gives you the renewed faith that
together we can change sentencing laws!
Celebrate your victory!
With great joy,
Julie
Julie Stewart
President and Founder
P.S. — To support FAMM’s continuing success, please donate here.
*****************************************************************************************************************************************************************

ha_state_worker51272.JPGLess than one month after ending furloughs for about 200,000 state workers, Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger this morning brought back a scaled-down version of the policy, effective Sunday.

The governor made the decision this week after Controller John Chiang said that unless lawmakers enacted a budget soon, the state’s cash would go into the red by October. Chiang said he’ll start issuing IOUs in August or September to conserve funds as long as possible.

“We have a fiscal crisis,” Schwarzenegger spokesman Aaron McLear said this morning as he explained the new furlough order. “We’re doing what we have to do to conserve cash.”

Like the policy that ended June 30, the governor’s new executive order requires employees take three unpaid days off per month. But unlike that policy, it has no termination date: Furloughs will end when lawmakers pass a 2010-11 budget. That could be weeks or months after the Legislature reconvenes on Monday.

And unlike earlier policies, the new order exempts employees who work several departments, specifically the Board of Equalization and the Franchise Tax Board, the Employment Development Department, State Compensation Insurance Fund, the California Housing Finance Authority and the California Earthquake Authority.

The order doesn’t explain the criteria for deciding to exclude those departments.

McLear said that the administration couldn’t exclude those employees previously because the state faced twin revenue and cash crunches.

“Last year we were in free-fall,” he said, but now the revenue crunch has eased, which allows the state some furlough flexibility.

Today’s order also excludes about 37,000 state workers in six unions that recently reached tentative labor agreements with the Schwarzenegger administration.

“We expect the Legislature to quickly ratify those contracts next week,” McLear said.

Those deals contain concessions, including monthly furlough days and higher out-of-pocket employee pension contributions, that save the state money and make furloughing those employees unnecessary, McLear said.

As part of the agreements, the administration promised that the Legislature will enact measures that will protect those protection from furloughs, minimum wage or both.

“We keep our promises to the unions,” McLear said.

Another six unions representing about 150,000 state employees, including the 95,000-member SEIU Local 1000, haven’t yet come to labor terms with the governor.

Continue Reading @ The SacBee

Has the Most Common Marijuana Test Resulted in Tens of Thousands of Wrongful Convictions?

28 Jul

More than 800,000 people are arrested on marijuana charges each year in the United States, many on the basis of an error-prone test.

July 28, 2010 |

Raised in Montana and a resident of Alaska for 18 years, Robin Rae Brown, 48, always made time to explore in the wilderness. On March 20, 2009, she parked her pickup truck outside Weston, Florida, and hiked off the beaten path along a remote canal and into the woods to bird watch and commune with nature. “I saw a bobcat and an osprey,” she recalls. “I stopped once in a nice spot beneath a tree, sat down and gave prayers of thanksgiving to God.” For that purpose, Robin had packed a clay bowl and a “smudge stick,” a stalk-like bundle of sage, sweet grass, and lavender that she had bought at an airport gift shop in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Under the tree, she lit the end of the smudge stick and nestled it inside the bowl. She waved the smoke up toward her heart and over her head and prayed. Spiritual people from many cultures, including Native Americans, consider smoke to be sacred, she told me, and believe that it can carry their prayers to the heavens.

As darkness approached, she returned to her pickup truck to find Broward County’s Deputy Sheriff Dominic Raimondi and Florida Fish and Wildlife’s Lieutenant David Bingham looking inside the cab. The two men asked what she was doing and when she said she had been bird watching, Bingham asked whether she had binoculars. As she opened her knapsack, Officer Raimondi spotted her incense and asked if he could see it. He took the bowl and incense, asking whether it was marijuana. “No,” she recalls saying. “It’s my smudge, which is a blend of sage, sweet grass, and lavender.” “Smells like marijuana to me,” said Raimondi, who admitted he had never heard of a smudge stick. He then ordered Robin to stand by her truck, while he took the incense back to his car and conducted a common field test, known as a Duquenois-Levine, or D-L, test. The result was positive for marijuana.

Robin protested, telling them the smudge was available for purchase online for about $7 and gave them the name of a Web site that sold it — information Officer Bingham used his laptop to verify. But the men still searched her truck. After an hour and a half they finally allowed Robin to go home and told her that if a lab test confirmed the field test results, a warrant would be issued for her arrest.

Exactly 90 days later, Robin was arrested at the spa in Weston, Florida where she has worked as a massage therapist for three years. She was handcuffed in front of clients and co-workers, and charged with felony possession of marijuana. She was brought to a local police precinct in the town of Davie where she was booked and held for three hours. Unable to post the $1,000 bail because she was not allowed to call her boyfriend Michael, she was transferred to the Women’s Correctional Facility in Pompano Beach. At no time was she read her rights.

Five hours after her arrest, she was finally allowed a brief phone call and left a message for Michael to post her bail. At the jail, a female officer came in and told Robin to take off all her clothes. She had already been searched at the precinct station and had her shoes, socks and bra confiscated. “I’m on my period,” she said. “I don’t care,” said the officer, who ordered her to pull her underwear down to her ankles, squat over the floor drain and cough. The following morning at 4:30 a.m. she was released onto the streets of Pompano Beach with no idea where she was.

The next day, Robin found a lab and submitted to voluntary hair and urine tests. These came back clean. She had previously worked for 16 years as a transportation systems specialist with the Federal Aviation Administration, a job that required airport security clearances, so drug tests were nothing new to her. During those years, she was frequently required to pass random drug and alcohol tests.

She later learned that her incense had never been subjected to a confirmatory lab test. She had been arrested and jailed solely on the basis of her positive D-L test results.

The Preferred Test for Marijuana

The Duquenois test was developed in the late 1930s by a French pharmacist, Pierre Duquénois, while he was working for the United Nations division of narcotics. In 1950, he completed a study for the UN which claimed that his test was “very specific” for marijuana; it was adopted by the UN and crime labs around the world as the preferred test for marijuana.

After undergoing several modifications, including the use of chloroform, the test became known as the Duquenois-Levine test, and became widely popular. Though scientists would show in the 1960s and 1970s that the D-L test was nonspecific, meaning it rendered false positives, it remains today the most commonly used test for marijuana — used in many of the 800,000 marijuana arrests that take place each year.

The test is a simple chemical color reagent test, easy to perform but difficult to interpret. To administer the test, a police officer simply has to break a seal on a tiny micropipette of chemicals, and insert a particle of the suspected substance; if the chemicals turn purple, this indicates the possibility of marijuana. But the color variations can be subtle, and readings can vary by examiner.

The field test kits are produced by a variety of manufacturers, the most popular brands being NIK and ODV. Literature about the D-L from NIK’s makers states that it is only a “screening” test that “may or may not yield a valid result” and may produce “false positive results.” Yet, since at least 1990, arresting officers, with the support of prosecutors, have regularly bypassed lab analysts and have purported to identify marijuana at hearings and trials only on the basis of visual inspection and the nonspecific D-L field test. And the manufacturers have taken note.

In 1998, ODV reported in its newsletter with seeming satisfaction that a growing number of police departments were using its D-L field test, marketed as the NarcoPouch, as “their sole method of testing and identifying Marihuana [sic]… To have Officers properly trained in identifying Marijuana and taking the Crime Lab out of the loop is a tremendous cost saving venture for the State…and gives the individual Officers testing the material a greater sense of satisfaction in completing their own cases” (emphasis added). NIK, too, argued that depending exclusively on D-L field tests saves time and money. “Crime laboratories are so busy that drug tests take too long,” NIK states on its website. “With the cooperation of the Prosecuting Attorney, many police agencies have turned to presumptive drug testing. If the results indicate that an illegal substance is present, criminal charges may be filed.

In June 2006, the Virginia legislature went so far as to pass “emergency regulations” permitting law-enforcement officers to testify at trial for simple possession of marijuana cases solely on the basis of a D-L field test. Prior to these regulations, officers had to send suspected material to an approved lab for testing. Nothing in the new legislation specified that the field tests used had to be specific, or even accurate. Frederic Whitehurst, a North Carolina-based defense attorney and former FBI special agent with a doctorate in chemistry, considers the law to be an unconstitutional usurpation of the authority of the courts to determine what test results can be admitted as valid evidence.

The trend toward police officers using the D-L as a confirmatory test has been encouraged by the National Institute of Justice, an agency of the Department of Justice which has funded programs to transform police officers into court experts, based on their use of these faulty field tests. One such ongoing program for the Utah police claims to offer, in four days, “the necessary training” to positively identify marijuana, which would allow officers to serve as “expert witnesses in the courtroom setting.” The program briefly covers the “botany, chemistry and analysis of marijuana preparations,” after which police officers, including street detectives and crime scene lab personnel, “will assume responsibility for all of their agency’s marijuana submissions.” By the end of 2005, such submissions became the exclusive provenance of the Utah officers who had attended the training, and suspected marijuana samples were no longer accepted at the state lab for processing.

In 2009, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation trained more than 1,600 police officers in the use of the D-L test, resulting in a 98 percent reduction in the use of marijuana lab tests. This troubling program garnered the bureau a 2009 Vollmer Excellence in Forensic Science Award by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Test ‘Should Never Be Relied Upon’

Despite its widespread use, as early as the 1960s, the D-L test had been proven incapable of definitively identifying the presence of marijuana in a seized substance. A 1968 article in the Chemistry and Pharmacy Bulletin of Japan reported that the D-L tests “lack in adequate specificity.” In 1969, M. J. de Faubert Maunder, a chemist in the Ministry of Technology, a UK government agency, documented the unreliability of the D-L test in an article in the Bulletin on Narcotics, noting that test results depended heavily on the subjective judgment of the analyst — and thus could easily vary dramatically from lab to lab. “[A] positive test is not recorded until this colour has been identified,” he wrote, “and because it is almost impossible to describe in absolute terms it is best recognised by experience.” Moreover, he reported finding twenty-five plant substances that would produce a D-L test result barely distinguishable from that of Cannabis and cautioned that the D-L test “should never be relied upon as the only positive evidence.”

Several articles in the Journal of Forensic Sciences further disproved any claims that the test could specifically identify marijuana. A 1969 study in the journal reported false positive results from “a variety of vegetable extracts.” A 1972 study found that the D-L test would test positive for many commonly occurring plant substances known as resorcinols, which are found in over-the-counter medicines. For instance, Sucrets lozenges tested positive for marijuana. This study concluded that the D-L test is useful only as a “screen” test and was not sufficiently selective to be relied upon for “identification.” Still another study, in 1974, showed that 12 of 40 plant oils and extracts studied gave positive D-L test results.

In 1975, Dr. Marc Kurzman at the University of Minnesota, in collaboration with fourteen other scientists, published a study in The Journal of Criminal Defense that concluded: “The microscopic and chemical screening tests presently used in marijuana analysis are not specific even in combination for ‘marijuana’ defined in any way.” In the 35 years since that study was published, no one has ever refuted this finding.

Indeed, recent research has confirmed Kurzman’s findings. In 2008, Whitehurst, the chemist and former FBI agent, substantiated Kurzman’s findings in an article in the Texas Tech Law Review. That same year, Dr. Omar Bagasra, director of the South Carolina Center for Biotechnology, conducted experiments in his lab also demonstrating that the D-L test is nonspecific and renders false positives. Bagasra, too, has impeccable credentials — he’s a leading pathologist and a board-certified forensic examiner.

A number of high courts have been persuaded by this evidence, and have found that the D-L test does not prove the presence of marijuana in a seized substance. In 1973, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that the D-L test “standing alone is not sufficient to meet the burden of proving the identity of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court specifically noted that the D-L field tests used in this marijuana possession case “are not exclusive or specific for marijuana.”

Similarly, in 1979, a trial judge in North Carolina blocked the marijuana conviction of Richard Tate, which was to be based on positive D-L test results. In this case, too, the trial judge found that the D-L test was “not specific for marijuana” and had “no scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of identifying the controlled substance marijuana.” On that basis, the judge allowed the defendant to suppress the use of the test results as evidence. This finding was upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court, which found that D-L test “was not scientifically acceptable because it was not specific for marijuana” and thus “the test results were properly suppressed.”

Also in 1979, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia ruled that the results of nonspecific tests could not be the basis for prosecution or conviction. In other words, if the only evidence is a positive D-L test, then the case must be dismissed.

As noted, even the test’s manufacturers do not claim that their product can definitively identify marijuana. The literature accompanying NIK’s NarcoPouch 908 cautions, “The results of a single test may or may not yield a valid result… There is no existing chemical reagent system, adaptable to field use, that will completely eliminate the occurrence of an occasional invalid test results [sic]. A complete forensic laboratory would be required to qualitatively identify an unknown suspect substance.”

Shoddy Science

Shoddy science, though, has muddied the waters. Several studies claim, falsely, to have validated the specificity of the D-L test. For instance, a seemingly authoritative 2000 study funded by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) purported to have validated the capacity of the D-L test to specifically and definitively identify marijuana. The title of the article, published in Forensic Science International, “Validation of Twelve Chemical Spot Tests for the Detection of Drugs of Abuse,” misstated the researchers’ actual findings. In fact, the study’s authors found that the twelve tests it analyzed, including the D-L, were nonspecific. “The tests,” they wrote, “are not always specific for a single drug or class.” Speaking of the D-L test, they wrote that “mace, nutmeg and tea reacted with the modified Duquenois-Levine,” meaning that they produced false positives. They also noted, echoing Maunder’s 1969 article, that the D-L test is subjective: “The actual color…may vary depending on many factors [including] the color discrimination of the analyst.”

The best-known D-L “validation” study, and thus the most damaging to defendants, was published in 1972 by John Thornton and George Nakamura in Journal of Forensic Science Society. It instantly made the D-L test the gold standard across the country for marijuana identification. But just like the NIST study, this report is internally contradictory and scientifically flawed. On the opening page of this article, the authors state that the D-L test is a “confirmation” test for marijuana. Such a test must be capable of proving the presence of the drug beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically identifying the drug to the exclusion of all other possible substances and producing neither false positives nor false negatives.

However, the researchers’ own findings contradict their conclusion and show instead that the D-L test merely screens for marijuana. The authors themselves reported that the D-L test gave false positives and was not a confirmatory test even when cystolithic hairs — visible on the leaves of marijuana and other plants — are found on the suspected substance. They claimed that “the Duquenois-Levine test is found to be useful in the confirmation of marijuana” when cystolithic hairs are observed “since none of the 82 species possessing hairs similar to those found on marijuana yield a positive test.” The problem is, as the authors noted, there are hundreds of plants with cystolithic hairs that they did not test, making their sample of eighty-two species woefully inadequate. In effect, they admitted that the botanical exam itself was nonspecific. Combining two nonspecific tests does not make a specific, confirmatory test, as the D-L and the botanical exam both could easily render false positives.

Without having proved specificity, the authors nevertheless claimed it: “The specificity of the Duquenois reaction has been established, empirically at least, over the past three decades. No plant material other than marijuana has been found to give an identical reaction.” They also noted its widespread use as if it were proof of its efficacy, mentioning that the D-L test was adopted as a preferential test by the League of Nations Sub-Committee of Cannabis and that a version of the test was proposed by the United Nations Committee on Narcotics as a specific test for marijuana. (The UN subsequently found that only gas chromatography/mass spectrometry analysis could affirmatively identify marijuana.)

Inexplicably, this Thornton-Nakamura study is cited by the Drug Enforcement Administration and labs around the country as justifying the use of the D-L test alone or in combination with the microscopic visual exam for proving the presence of marijuana in a seized substance. Even some courts have erroneously ruled that the D-L test is specific and confirmatory. The most egregious example occurred in 2006. U.S. District Judge William Alsup found the D-L test to be a specific identification test and declared, grandiosely: “Despite the many hundreds of thousands of drug convictions in the criminal justice system in America, there has not been a single documented false-positive identification of marijuana or cocaine when the methods used by the SFPD [San Francisco Police Department] Crime Lab are applied by trained, competent analysts.” In fact, according to an affidavit in that case from a senior criminologist at the SFPD, its lab had, for forty years, used the D-L test in combination with a botanical exam to identify marijuana — two nonspecific tests that can each produce false positives. (A spokeswoman says that current SFPD policy is to subsequently confirm these results with gas chromatography/mass spectrometry.)

In March 2009, a committee of the National Academy of Sciences, speaking of the D-L and other tests, called the analysis of controlled substances “a mature forensic science discipline”; “one of the areas with a strong scientific underpinning”; and an area in which “there exists an adequate understanding of the uncertainties and potential errors.” These incorrect assertions relied on assurances from government witnesses that “experienced forensic chemists and good forensic laboratories understand which tests (or combinations of tests) provide adequate reliability.” The committee’s main witness was Joseph Bono, the former director of a regional DEA lab, who had previously issued a sworn affidavit, referring to the D-L and other forensic tests, which asserted that “tests and instruments that are properly used by qualified forensic chemists are incapable of producing a false positive.” But experience and competence cannot make a test specific if it is not — nor can they make it immune from false positives.

In 2008, Senator Jim Webb, D-VA, said, in announcing a proposed bill, that “the criminal justice system as we understand it today is broken, unfair.” This unfairness is visible every day in the disparate and contradictory court decisions regarding the admissibility of D-L test results. Not only have courts contradicted one another on admissibility, but some courts have even chosen to admit the results of a D-L test while ruling that it does not prove the presence of marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt. This patchwork of admissibility means that a person in one state can be convicted of possessing marijuana on the sole basis of the D-L test while a resident of another state cannot.

In 1978, the Supreme Court of Illinois in The People of the State of Illinois v. Peppe Park illustrated this confused, unconstitutional state of affairs. In denying the admission of ipse dixit (“It’s marijuana because I say it’s marijuana”) reports, the court found that “police officers may not be presumed to possess the requisite expertise to identify a narcotic substance…because it simply is far too likely that a nonexpert would err in his conclusion on this matter, and taint the entire fact-finding process.” This court cited a study that found 241 incorrect identifications of marijuana by arresting police officers. Yet in the same decision, the court erroneously claimed that “to determine accurately that a particular substance contains cannabis, all that is necessary is microscopic examination combined with the Duquenois-Levine test.”

Challenging the Test

Robin Rae Brown never even faced trial on marijuana possession charges. After she was released from jail, she retained this author as a defense expert. When I first spoke with her attorney, Bill Ullman, he had never heard of the D-L test and said he normally plea-bargained cases like Robin’s. I urged him to challenge the test and provided him with several scientific studies cited in this article, relevant court decisions, including Jackson v. Virginia, and other information. When Ullman made inquiries, he discovered that the sheriff’s department had never performed a lab test to confirm his field test results. Robin, he discovered, had been charged with a felony solely on the basis of the D-L test and Officer Raimondi’s “opinion.”

At Ullman’s insistence, the sheriff’s department finally performed a gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS) analysis on Robin’s smudge, which came out negative. State Attorney Berki Alvarez immediately dropped the charges against her, noting to Ullman, “the scariness that a person could be arrested under such conditions.”

Even scarier was the lab’s revelation that it does not conduct GC/MS analysis until just before a trial, as most marijuana possession defendants plea bargain before the trial. If Robin had accepted a plea bargain, she would have been wrongfully convicted and saddled with a criminal record that could have damaged her future job prospects. How many others before and since have accepted plea bargains based on false positives from a D-L test?

“I am just now willing to share this story,” Robin wrote months after her arrest, “because it was embarrassing and I didn’t want to worry my family and friends.” After some serious thought, she recently decided to file a lawsuit for wrongful arrest. “I would like to see them stop using the bogus field tests and to improve their procedures at the county crime lab,” she says. “I would like the public to be aware of the faulty field tests.”

In truth, everyone arrested on marijuana charges has a Constitutional right to a GC/MS analysis. Otherwise, they are being denied both due process and a fair trial. “It is not only unnecessary for the courts to continue to accept conclusory drug identifications based on nonspecific tests, it is also unwise for them to do so,” wrote Edward Imwinkelried, a professor of law at the University of California at Davis whose work on scientific evidence has been cited by the Supreme Court. “Conclusory drug identification testimony is antithetical and offensive to the scientific tradition, and courts should not allow ipse dixit to masquerade as scientific testimony… Even more importantly, sustaining such drug identifications places a judicial imprimatur on testimony that cannot justifiably be labeled scientific. The rejection of such identifications is necessitated not only by due process but also by the simple demands of intellectual honesty.”

Sustaining evidence from nonspecific tests like the D-L, he concludes, “is both bad science and bad law.”

This article was reported in collaboration with The Investigative Fund at The Nation Institute.

John Kelly is a court-certified expert witness on drug tests and author of ‘False Positives Equal False Justice’ and the forthcoming book, ‘How to Obtain a Pretrial Dismissal of Marijuana Charges or an Acquittal.’ He can be contacted at: kjohn39679@aol.com.

Source: AlertNet.org

An Open Letter to Lindsay Lohan from the ACLU

27 Jul

I was just about to blog about Lindsey Lohan and all the media attention her little stint in jail has generated, when I came across this, from the ACLU. Personally, Iam tired of seeing all the articles (many totally exaggerated and some outright lies) and google alerts…Big deal, an actress, who has oodles & oodles of money went to jail for violating her probation. Whether she does 9 days or 23, understand, that if it were YOU or ME, we would be doing the 90 days. Thats how the system works…and we certainly would not be in PC.

An Open Letter to Lindsay Lohan from the ACLU

Dear Lindsay,

We know that going to jail is scary. But we can assure you that your experience at the women’s facility in Lynwood, outside Los Angeles, is likely to be starkly different from the thousands of others serving time and awaiting trial in the Los Angeles jails. Based on the ACLU’s decades of experience as an official court-appointed monitor of the jails, and the stories of countless women with whom we’ve spoken, the facility where you are staying is an overcrowded detention facility where women are needlessly humiliated for so long that they come to expect sub-human treatment.

It’s a place where an eight-months-pregnant woman was forced to sleep on the floor because she could not access the top bunk to which she was assigned. A  place where women have said they are made to stand naked while menstruating, as they waited for jail-issued clothes.  And a place where women routinely tell us they cannot get access to the same medications they took in the community (though we doubt that you will face this same problem.)

Group punishments and degrading group strip searches are routine, as are reports of deputies calling women “bitches” and other derogatory names. And while you get private visits with your family and friends, every other woman’s visitors must wait in long lines on the weekends.

We know from the more than 4,500 complaints we receive annually that the women’s facility is a lot nicer than the Men’s Central Jail – where rats roam the tiers, and violence is as routine as sunshine in California.  We’ve seen men with broken legs and black eyes. It‘s not uncommon for a prisoner to be thrown up against the wall or punched, simply for asking a deputy a question.  In May of this year, the ACLU’s National Prison Project and the ACLU of Southern California – which jointly serve as official jail monitors – released a joint report that documents a prisoner’s experience in which deputies severely beat him and threatened him if he should report it.  He said he was returning from meeting with his attorney, when a few deputies surrounded him and started kicking and hitting him. They bruised his nose and forehead, split his lip, and sprained his arm. And there are dozens of stories just like this one.

Lindsay, even though it’s going to be difficult for you to be incarcerated even for a few weeks, rest assured that your celebrity is something that we who frequently visit Los Angeles’s jails see as an opportunity to draw attention to conditions in the jails. You will have a window into the world of Los Angeles jails, and we hope you will use it to talk to the press about conditions here.

Source: ACLU Blog of Rights

Restorative justice’s impact on participants’ psychological and physical health

27 Jul

from the study by Tanya Rugge & Terri-Lynne Scott:

Research on restorative justice has cited many positive benefits for participants. For example, restorative justice processes are satisfying to both victims and offenders. However, despite references made to positive impacts on participants’ well-being, few studies specifically examine the impact of restorative justice processes on participants’ psychological health and physical health using specific health indicators.

This study utilized a quasi-experimental, repeated-measures design to assess changes in psychological and physical health in 92 participants (50 victims and 42 offenders) who experienced a restorative justice process.

….First, the results showed that there were positive changes in participants’ psychological health from program commencement to program completion. In this regard, these findings are consistent with past research. This study extended the available research by examining over a dozen specific psychological health items (e.g., anger, fear, shame/guilt, depression, etc.) – all indicators where RJ facilitators had reported changes in past clientele. Decreases were noted on all these variables and when the various items were summed through the Psychological Health Checklist (PsC), decreases in score from preprogram to post-program were noted for 84.8% (n = 78) of participants. Eleven percent (10.9%; n = 10) of participants exhibited no change from pre-program to post-program; however, it should be noted that these participants all had low scores at commencement (meaning few problems). Specifically, 90% (n = 9) of the no-change group had scores of five or less and 50% (n = 5) had scores of one or less. In addition, there were no significant differences between victims and offenders – they both exhibited positive changes over the course of the program.

Interestingly, a significant difference was found between participants who experienced a victim-offender meeting and those who did not, with meeting participants scoring lower on the PsC at both pre-program and post-program. It could be that participants who experienced a higher degree of psychological health symptoms (e.g., upset) did not want to add the potential stress or anxiousness associated with a meeting. RJ proponents would argue that it is precisely these participants who would benefit the most from an encounter. Participants who experienced a victim-offender meeting were compared to those who did not, and there were no significant differences in psychological health change.

….The results indicated that there were positive changes in participants’ physical health, as measured by the indicators, from pre-program to post-program. Although there were fewer indicators pertaining to physical health (6 items compared to 15 items for psychological health), over forty percent (41.3%, n = 38) of participants exhibited no physical health indicators at pre-program, and this increased to 56.5% (n = 52) at post-program. It was therefore not surprising that 45.7% (n = 42) of participants did not exhibit any change in the physical health indicators from pre-program to post-program, though 36.9% (n = 34) did exhibit positive change (i.e., a decrease in number of indicators as reflected by a decrease in PhC total score).

Victims and offenders were compared on the various physical health indicators. We found that there was a significant difference between victims and offenders on only one item, “illegal drug use”. This was not a surprising result. Interestingly, one offender increased the level of alcohol and drug use from preprogram to post-program. While this result pertained to only one offender, and it may be a spontaneous, unrelated change, it would not be unexpected to see this type of result again. Past research has found that offenders describe the RJ process as very difficult, with the meeting being the most difficult part. It is possible that the increase is reflective of a coping mechanism for these offenders. Overall, for the 58.7% (n = 54) of participants who exhibited at least one physical health problem at preprogram, 63.0% (n = 34) exhibited a positive change and 20.4% (n = 11) exhibited no change in the number of physical health symptoms from pre-program to post-program.

(Citations were omitted.) Read the whole study.

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